Annual Meeting Papers

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The Role of Collective Identification
in Congregational Conflict

Leanna K. Fuller, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN

Draft only: please do not cite without permission.

             In 2005, a Protestant congregation with which I was closely affiliated became embroiled in an intense conflict related to homosexuality.  That summer, the United Church of Christ—the denomination to which the congregation belonged—had passed a resolution supporting marriage rights for same-sex couples.  Almost immediately, people within my congregation began taking adamant stands on the issue—some demanding that the congregation disassociate from the denomination, others insisting that the church maintain its denominational ties and practice hospitality toward all.  As a result, the congregation had to take a vote on whether to continue its covenant relationship with the UCC.  During the three-month period between the initial protests and the actual vote, our congregation attempted to provide opportunities for conversation about the issue of homosexuality.  The senior pastor and I envisioned these dialogues as “safe spaces” where individuals would be able to express their views freely, while recognizing that disagreement and conflict need not lead to fragmentation or dissolution.

             Unfortunately, our vision for peaceful, productive conversation between church members was never realized.  In fact, the “dialogue” we worked so hard to create often dissolved into angry exchanges in which people accused each other of being “un-Christian” or of ignoring Scriptural mandates.  Furthermore, certain members of the parish seemed to have an intense need for others to share their particular theological views; for some, it seemed that those who disagreed automatically became “others” and no longer counted as members of the same faith perspective.  By the time of the vote, the situation had become so polarized that individuals with opposing viewpoints had stopped speaking to one another.  Then, when the results were announced, those who perceived themselves as “the losers” immediately transferred their membership to other churches.  Ultimately, our congregation chose to stay in the United Church of Christ, but at the cost of some sixty members who believed that an essential tenet of their faith had been tossed aside.   

             At the time that this conflict took place, I saw the problem primarily in terms of theological disagreement between church members.  However, further reflection on this event suggests that more subtle social and psychological dynamics may have been at play.  Was this conflict really about beliefs, or was something more fundamental at stake for the church members involved?  Why did the denomination’s equal marriage resolution prove so threatening to some parishioners?  And, why did individuals identify with only one “side” of the debate, rather than seeing all of the congregants as fellow members of the church and denomination?  In an attempt to answer these questions, I have searched for theoretical frameworks that might shed light on what happened within this congregation.  The discipline of social psychology, I contend, offers just such frameworks in the form of social identity theory and self-categorization theory.  This paper explores the ways in which these unique approaches to identity might contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics that I observed.  I will argue that the concepts of social identity and group polarization contained within these theories demonstrate the significance of collective identification in situations of intergroup conflict, and thereby provide important insights into the broader group dynamics that may operate within religious organizations.

Social Identity Theory & Self-Categorization Theory     

             To illustrate the importance of collective identification within situations of intergroup conflict, I will first examine two major social psychological theories that have devoted sustained attention to this dimension of human life:  namely, social identity theory and self-categorization theory.  I will begin by briefly sketching the contours of these theories, and then apply some of their concepts to the case I introduced above. 

             Social Identity Theory: "Social identity" is a term that originated in the social identity theory pioneered by social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner.  This theory posits that human beings possess more than just individual dimensions of identity; they also possess group identities which are generated from the various social groups to which they belong.  One of the earliest articulations of this theory appeared in Tajfel and Turner’s 1979 article entitled “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.”  In this article, Tajfel and Turner make two central claims that clearly distinguish their position from previous approaches to identity.  First, the authors argue that in addition to individual personality traits, identity can also refer to the ways in which an individual identifies with a certain group.  This claim stands in marked contrast to many earlier social psychological theories, which had attempted to explain intergroup dynamics in terms of “intraindividual or interpersonal psychological processes” (Tajfel and Turner, p. 33).  

             Secondly, Tajfel and Turner contend that actual conflict of interest between groups is not necessary to produce “in-group bias” or “the tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in evaluations and behavior” (p. 38).  In making this claim, Tajfel and Turner clearly differentiate their position from “realistic group conflict theory,” which had maintained that conflict between social groups arises from competition for actual social commodities like wealth or power, which are limited in supply.  Tajfel and Turner argue against this view by appealing to Tajfel’s now-famous 1971 experiment, in which subjects were divided into two groups along completely arbitrary lines and asked to allocate rewards to other individuals identified only by group membership.  The results of this experiment showed that “even these most minimal of conditions were sufficient to produce in-group bias:  subjects tended to assign more money to individuals who were members of the same group as themselves” (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994, p. 42).  In other words, the fact that subjects in the study acted in accordance with their (arbitrary) group membership even when they received no actual benefit for doing so shows that “real” conflict of interest need not exist for in-group identification and bias to develop.1  Furthermore, Tajfel’s experiment demonstrates that collective, not individual, identification functioned as the key motivating factor in this context.  Based on these experimental findings (which have since been replicated many times), Tajfel and Turner argue for a conception of identity that gives adequate consideration to individuals’ group identifications, and that functions even in the absence of actual conflicts of interest between such groups.

             This notion of in-group bias represents a key component of Tajfel and Turner’s articulation of social identity theory.  In fact, based on the empirical study mentioned above, Tajfel and Turner claim that “in-group bias is a remarkably omnipresent feature of intergroup relations” (p. 38).  Furthermore, these authors argue that “pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other” (pp. 40-41).  This statement highlights the importance of social comparison within social identity theory, since individuals must compare groups against one another to find the one that most appropriately matches themselves on relevant dimensions.  Through this process, then, the individual’s comparison of groups functions to “provide a system of orientation for self-reference,” thus “creat[ing] and defin[ing] the individual’s place in society” (Tajfel and Turner, p. 40, emphasis in text).   In this way, Tajfel and Turner arrive at a definition of social identity as “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (p. 40).  While this definition highlights the importance of social comparison processes in forming individual identity, it proves less successful in explaining why particular social categories emerge in particular contexts.  In an attempt to provide a more thorough explanation of this phenomenon, John C. Turner later developed self-categorization theory, which built upon many of the tenets originally stipulated by social identity theory.  It is to a more detailed exploration of self-categorization theory that I now turn.

             Self-Categorization Theory:  Although self-categorization theory emerged later than social identity theory, it actually provides a broader theoretical framework in which to understand the complexities of individual identity development within social contexts.  John C. Turner, who first articulated this theory in 1985, notes that

. . . the crucial fact about the public setting is that it is shared with others and provides a comparative context within which people can categorize themselves as identical to

or different from others.  Such contexts, therefore, change the level and content of self-identity in terms of how people perceive themselves and not merely how they look to others.  (1991, p. 130, emphasis in text)

             Within self-categorization theory, then, the focus shifts from simply categorizing other individuals or groups, to categorizing oneself as like or unlike other individuals or groups.  Social psychologists Penelope Oakes, Alexander Haslam, and John Turner (1994) further characterize the theoretical shift from social identity to self-categorization in terms of moving “from Tajfel’s conception of social identity as reflecting group affiliations, to Turner’s suggestion that social identity comprised social categorizations of the self which caused group phenomena” (p. 93, emphasis in text).  From this perspective, then, the relationship between individual and collective identity is dialectical, with each element both reflecting and influencing the other.

             In their discussion of self-categorization theory in Stereotyping and Social Reality, Oakes, Haslam, and Turner also provide a helpful summary of key theoretical concepts that illuminate the applicability of this theory to the specific context of intergroup conflict.  First of all, these authors note that self-categorization theory “emphasizes the fact that categorization is a dynamic, context-dependent process, determined by comparative relations within a given context” (p. 95, emphasis in text).  Categorization, then, is a process of social comparison not only between groups, but between differences between groups.  This concept, known as the “meta-contrast principle,” states that “a given set of items is more likely to be categorized as a single entity to the degree that differences within that set of items are less than the differences between that set and others within the comparative context” (Oakes et al., p. 96, emphasis in text).  This principle helps to explain the process of categorization in general, and social categorization in particular, by delineating the specific criteria that are used to mark the boundaries between categories—namely, the perception of greater differences between groups than among them.

             Additionally, Oakes, Haslam, and Turner describe the notions of salience, accessibility, and fit as important determining factors in the categorization process.  Category salience refers to the “psychological significance” of a category within a given context (p. 43); thus, in order for a category to become a basis for social comparison, it must prove highly relevant for the person doing the comparing.  In this discussion of category salience, the authors build on the work of Jerome Bruner, who argued that category activation relies on an interactive process between various categories’ accessibility and fit.  Accessibility simply refers to a perceiver’s ability and readiness to use a particular category, while fit refers to the degree of match between perceptual input and categories that have already been stored in the perceiver’s memory.

             Oakes, Haslam, and Turner take Bruner’s ideas even further by delineating two specific kinds of fit that operate to produce social category salience.  Comparative fit “describes the character of comparative relations between people which would lead them to be represented by a social category” (p. 117).  In other words, comparative fit refers to the conditions in which a perceiver would be likely to view persons as members of a particular group, rather than as individual personalities.  The authors note that comparative fit often depends on a high meta-contrast ratio between intergroup and intragroup differences.  Thus, as noted above, if differences between groups are perceived as greater than differences within groups, social categories are more likely to become salient and used as the basis for comparison.

             In addition to the relationship between groups, categorization also depends on the social meaning of similarities and differences between people.  This concept, known as normative fit, refers to “the match between category and reality in terms of content” (Oakes et al., p. 118).  In other words, simply observing that intergroup differences outweigh intragroup differences may not lead to a particular social categorization if the content of those differences is not congruent with the categories involved.  These descriptions of comparative and normative fit thus demonstrate that in order for social categories to become salient, they must match both the relationship between groups and the content of the differences that distinguish them.

             Application to the Case Study:  In the preceding sections, I have summarized conceptual elements from both social identity and self-categorization theory that can be helpfully applied to the case study with which I began this exploration.  First of all, I contend that the notions of social identity and social comparison gleaned from social identity theory prove especially useful in such an analysis.  Beginning with the theory’s premise that identity is comprised of both individual personality traits and group identifications, one can easily see how the conflict described in the case study represents not simply a clash of individual theological viewpoints, but rather a conflict between collective identities.  Although it would be tempting to characterize the identities involved in this situation as “pro gay marriage” and “anti gay marriage,” this would be misleading.  In fact, many of the parishioners who voted to stay in the UCC also opposed gay marriage, but felt it was important for the congregation to maintain its covenant relationship with the UCC.  Thus, the central issue in the case study was identification with the larger denomination, and not with one side of a political or theological issue.  In this sense, then, one can describe the collective identities involved in this congregational conflict as “pro UCC” and “anti UCC,” with each group defining itself as the in-group, and the opposing identity as the relevant out-group. 

             Furthermore, describing the situation in this way allows one to see how social comparison may have been operating in this context to produce collective identification.  In this particular scenario, all of the individuals involved were originally identified with the United Church of Christ by virtue of their church membership.  However, once the theological debate erupted, people had to decide whether to identify with the group advocating continued UCC affiliation, or with the group urging separation from the denomination.  Given that the two groups did not break down along rigid theological or political lines, one can infer that church members made comparisons between the two groups in an attempt to decide which one most closely matched the social categories to which they already perceived themselves as belonging.

             These concepts from social identity theory thus provide helpful insight into some of the social processes that may have been operating within my congregation.  However, as mentioned earlier, social identity theory does not fully explain why certain social categories become salient in particular contexts.  For this reason, I will utilize the notions of salience, accessibility, and fit as additional analytic tools in this case study.  When considering the nature of the conflict that erupted in my congregation five years ago, the first question one must answer is:  why did church members develop separate collective identities of pro-UCC versus anti-UCC, instead of maintaining the larger category of “UCC members” to which they all originally belonged?  In other words, why did the categories of pro- or anti-denomination become salient in this context? 

             Although the two collective identities involved in this situation did not break down along strict theological or political lines, it is important to remember that this conflict erupted in response to a particular action by the United Church of Christ—an action which was highly controversial and quite politicized.  As a result, those members of the congregation who already had ambivalent feelings about the UCC tended to become quite hostile toward it, whereas those who were more strongly identified with the denomination (regardless of their feelings about gay marriage) tended to argue for preserving the relationship.  I maintain that the very contentious and public action of the UCC made identification with it, or opposition to it, a much more salient category within the congregation. 

             The fact that the UCC’s 2005 equal marriage resolution made national news and was discussed in a variety of public settings also suggests that the categories of denominational affiliation or opposition became especially accessible in the situation I described.  In other words, because the unique characteristics of the UCC were suddenly brought into public view, individuals would be more likely to utilize their sense of identification with or difference from the denomination as categories for comparison with one another.  Similarly, the notion of fit proves helpful in analyzing the dynamics of this congregation’s conflict.  Recalling that comparative fit refers to the willingness to regard people as members of a particular group rather than individual personalities, it seems clear that such a dynamic was operating here.  In fact, in many cases, people who were close friends or even relatives identified with opposite sides in the conflict; this suggests that rather than seeing their loved ones as individuals with unique perspectives, church members were instead relating to one another as either “pro” or “anti” UCC.  Also, as mentioned earlier, comparative fit often depends on a high meta-contrast ratio, in which the differences between groups appear greater than the differences within them.  This principle seems particularly applicable to the situation described in the case study, since both the pro- and anti-UCC groups included individuals who differed greatly on many other personal aspects; however, when it came to the question of whether to remain with the UCC, there was a great deal of uniformity within the groups, and a high level of difference between them. 

Group Polarization

             Thus far, I have used specific concepts from both social identity theory and self-categorization theory to illustrate how collective identification may have been operating in the conflict I described in the opening case study.  Such concepts, I contend, shed light on the ways in which individuals within my congregation were acting according to their group identities as pro- or anti-UCC, rather than as unique individuals with a variety of diverse viewpoints.  However, these concepts do not exhaust the potential usefulness of these social psychological theories for analyzing this case study.  In fact, self-categorization theory offers a particularly helpful interpretation of group polarization that can also contribute to greater understanding of intergroup conflicts such as the one that occurred within my congregation. 

             In his 1991 book Social Influence, John C. Turner defines group polarization as “the finding that group discussion or some related group manipulation tends to strengthen the prevailing response tendency within a group.  The mean response of members tends to become more extreme after group interaction in the same direction as the mean response before interaction” (p. 49).  This phenomenon, discovered by James Stoner in 1961, became known as the “risky shift” and contradicted earlier assumptions that groups will typically converge on the average position of their members.  As a result, various social psychological theories developed in an attempt to explain group polarization.  Turner divides these theories into three main categories, including social comparison/value theory, persuasive arguments theory, and social conformity theory.  While Turner acknowledges that each of these theories provides some helpful insights into group polarization, he maintains that no one of them adequately explains why certain groups converge on the pre-test mean, while others polarize to an extreme.

             Turner argues that a self-categorization theory of group polarization overcomes this problem by positing that “people are conforming to a shared in-group norm, but that the norm is not the pre-test average but rather the prototypical position of the group” (p. 76).  In this view, the “prototype” is the position that most clearly represents the commonalities within the group as compared to members of an out-group.  According to Turner, this approach helps to explain both convergence on the mean and polarization within groups:  in both cases, “members are moving towards what they see as the consensual position of their group” (p. 77).  For Turner, then, the primary benefit of this approach is that it takes into account the importance of intergroup relations in polarization, rather than simply offering an explanation of why individuals move to one position or another within group contexts.  Indeed, Turner argues that the very phenomenon of group polarization “seems to show that something special does happen in the group, that groups produce emergent normative tendencies that are not reducible to an aggregation of individuals’ responses as they exist in isolation” (p. 51).

            This interpretation of group polarization from a self-categorization perspective seems especially applicable to the case study presented earlier, since over the course of the conflict, both identity groups seemed to move toward more extreme positions than they had displayed beforehand.  For instance, while the members of the pro-UCC group identified positively with the denomination before the conflict erupted, these identifications seemed to become much stronger as they compared themselves and entered into conflict with the out-group.  Similarly, the anti-UCC group members had previously exhibited ambivalent or slightly negative feelings toward the denomination, but when the congregation became embroiled in debate, they moved to a much more extreme, hostile position—one that posited disassociation from the UCC as the only viable solution.  Using Turner’s perspective on polarization, one could argue that each group was moving toward what their members perceived as the “prototypical” position:  namely, the position that most clearly represented each group’s commonalities as compared to the relevant out-group.  Since the main issue at stake for both groups revolved around denominational affiliation, each group moved toward an extreme position at opposite ends of the spectrum.  Although individual members of each group may have held less radical opinions than the group prototype, the pro-UCC group still argued vociferously for continued denominational ties, while the anti-UCC group insisted that disassociation was the only viable option.  In both cases, then, group members were converging not on an average, but on an “extremitized, consensual position” (Turner, 1991, p. 78).

             It is important to note here one other aspect of group polarization that proves particularly useful in analyzing the case study presented above.  As Turner mentioned in his definition, group polarization seems to be stimulated by discussion or some other form of group manipulation.  In other words, something unique must take place to strengthen the group’s prevailing view and produce an extremitized in-group norm; otherwise, the group would likely converge on the pre-test mean.  In their 1978 article entitled “Group-induced Polarization of Attitudes and Behavior,” Helmut Lamm and David G. Meyers point out that in situations of polarization, “the average group score tends to be amplified by discussion” (p. 147, emphasis in text).  Thus, intragroup discussion of a particular issue tends to contribute to the group’s movement toward a more extreme position, especially when compared to the position of a relevant out-group. 

            Lamm and Meyers further note that such intragroup discussion may not only produce polarization, but also intensify intergroup conflict:  “Intragroup interaction may magnify conflict partly because, as we noted earlier, the tendency of individuals to justify their own behavior when in conflict is intensified by discussion” (p. 160).  Finally, in their exploration of polarization in the “real world,” Lamm and Meyers cite the findings of an experiment that conducted opinion surveys both before and after the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968.  This experiment showed that “Group opinion differences were generally heightened by the dramatic event” (p. 161), thus providing a unique example of group polarization.  Although Lamm and Meyers admit that they do not know the exact causes of this shift, they hypothesize that dramatic public events stimulate discussion within groups and, as they have already shown, intragroup discussion tends to produce polarization.  Furthermore, Lamm and Meyers assert that when an event is “subject to multiple interpretations, intragroup discussion apparently intensifies the dominant local viewpoint” (p. 161).

            These observations about the role of intragroup discussion prove highly relevant for the current case study.  As Lamm and Meyers have suggested, dramatic public events often stimulate intragroup discussion, which can contribute significantly to the polarization process.  The fact that the UCC equal marriage resolution appeared in national press stories for several days suggests that it could have functioned as just such a “dramatic event” for members of our congregation—one that certainly would have fostered intragroup discussion.  In fact, as I found out during the course of our congregation’s protracted conflict, the anti-UCC group did engage in a number of intragroup discussions (primarily in the context of a Sunday School class) about the equal marriage resolution for several weeks before actually bringing their concerns before the entire church.  I contend that such discussions served to move the group toward a more extreme position than individual members of the group may have held beforehand, perhaps in an attempt to justify their proposed action of severing ties with the denomination.  As a result, when the anti-UCC group finally presented their views to the rest of the congregation, their position appeared quite radical, and may actually have convinced some undecided members to identify with the opposing out-group.  Thus, in its emphasis on movement toward more extreme positions and on the role of intragroup discussion in producing such movement, the notion of group polarization can provide a helpful theoretical construct with which to analyze the dynamics of the conflict described in the case study.

 

Conclusion
At first glance these concepts from social identity theory and self-categorization theory appear very technical, and may seem to have limited usefulness for a discussion of conflict within faith communities.  However, I have shown that these concepts can be usefully employed to analyze situations of congregational conflict, and to provide a unique perspective that one would miss using only intrapsychic tools.  For instance, a social psychological perspective helps us to understand why a congregation that previously had seemed quite cohesive could split so quickly into two opposed factions, rather than maintaining their shared religious or denominational identity as a source of unity.  Additionally, the concept of group polarization helps explain why these opposing factions take increasingly extreme positions rather than converging on the mean.  In these ways, social psychology offers convincing explanations for some of the key features of congregational conflict, which are not easily explicated by purely intrapsychic or interpersonal approaches.

             Thus, the resources of social psychology—particularly those supplied by social identity theory and self-categorization theory—can provide useful insights into the dynamics of the protracted conflict that I witnessed.  By establishing notions of social identity and group polarization, these theories offer new conceptual frameworks with which to examine the patterns of interaction between groups.  In this way, we can begin to see intergroup conflicts not simply as products of individual or interpersonal disagreements, but rather as a function of collective identification on the part of group members.  This insight not only illuminates the nature of intergroup conflicts, but can also provide leaders in organizational contexts with helpful conceptual tools to address these issues in constructive ways.

REFERENCES